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1 Introduction
Transmission of information plays a critical role in shaping investors’ and managers’ expectation
of the future, which has significant implications for the pricing of assets. In particular, mass
media outlets such as newspapers and online aggregators play an important role in disseminating
information, and the recent advent of the electronic platforms have substantially increased the
amount and scope of information provided, especially to individual investors.
Recent literature on such relation between media and the market has focused on two par-
ticular aspects of the media. The first strand of research focuses on the content of news to
evaluate directional market responses to such information. Many studies support the notion
that qualitative information embedded in news stories contributes to the mispricing of stocks –
Tetlock (2007), Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky and Mackassy (2008), Garcia (2013), and Karabulut
(2013) are further examples in this literature.
The second strand of research, to which I contribute, focuses on the arrival of information and
the subsequent increase in investor attention to asset markets. Merton’s (1987) theory predicts
that attention can increase market valuations directly by alleviating information frictions that
prevent investors from holding assets with little relevant information. Also, Barber and Odean
(2008) show that individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks and further
argue that individuals’ buying pressure temporary pushes up the price of such salient stocks,
followed by price reversal in the subsequent period.
Fang and Peress (2009) is the first paper to document the cross-sectional relation between
news coverage and stock returns. Using firm-specific news coverage in major newspapers, they
find that stocks without news coverage earn 3% higher annualized returns than stocks with
above-median news coverage. Further studies using more direct proxies for investor attention,
such as Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011), Kim and Meschke (2011), and Engelberg, Sasseville
and Williams (2012) seem to support their finding that heightened investor attention decreases
future stock returns.
On the contrary, Heston and Sinha (2015), a recent paper which examines stock return
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predictability using a more granular set of news data from Thomson Reuters, find that stocks
without news coverage actually underperform stocks with news coverage. To distinguish the
effect of news arrival from the effect of news content, they control for “neutral news” as defined
by their textual analysis.
This study investigates this discrepancy in the sign of the so-called “news coverage premium”
between Fang and Peress (2009) and Heston and Sinha (2015). I first present a detailed com-
parison of the two papers and identify potential sources of discrepancy that may be responsible.
The analysis suggests that a combination of differences in firm coverage, time period, types of
news items, and filter for news relevance contributes to the alarmingly different results.
To provide further evidence on the existence and the magnitude of news coverage premium, I
use an alternate source of news analytics called Ravenpack, which is different from the datasets
employed in the two papers. Ravenpack analyzes all articles on the Dow Jones Newswire and
delivers article-level metrics to its users with very minimal latency. For this study, I use Raven-
pack’s relevance score to filter out relevance news items, and the appropriateness of this relevance
threshold has been verified by previous studies.1
I find that stocks with low news coverage earn significantly higher future returns than stocks
that with high coverage. In the period January 2000 to November 2016, a portfolio of stocks in
the bottom decile of monthly news counts outperforms a portfolio of stocks in the top decile by
over 3% per year following portfolio formation, even after adjusting for market, size, book-to-
market, and momentum. This return premium for stocks with little news coverage is economi-
cally significant and also consistent with Merton’s (1987) theory.
On the other hand, I find that stocks with zero news coverage fails to provide any premium
over stocks with high news coverage. A closer examination reveals that the strategy seems
to perform well prior to the 2008 financial crisis, whereas it fails during the crisis and post-
crisis. Also, in the last several years of the period, the high-coverage portfolio actually seems
to produce better returns than the no-coverage portfolio, further contradicting the findings in
1See vonBeschwitz, Bastian, Donald B. Keim, and Massimo Massa. Media-driven high frequency trading:
Evidence from news analytics. INSEAD Working Paper, 2013
2
Fang and Peress (2009).
In short, my results seem to indicate a premium associated with little news coverage, which
is consistent with Fang and Peress (2009) – I find no substantial evidence supporting Heston
and Sinha (2015). There still exists, however, a glaring difference in my results between the
performance of the low-minus-high coverage strategy and the zero-minus-high coverage strategy.
As potential explanations, I provide three hypotheses: first, the two market crashes between
2000 and 2016 may have changed the way investors perceive news; second, the advent of elec-
tronic news platforms and subsequent explosive growth in the quantity and scope of coverage
may have rendered firms without any news too risky; and third, the introduction of more trans-
parent accounting and firm disclosures may have reduced the premium associated with no news
coverage.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I provide detailed comparative
analysis of the two aforementioned papers. Section 3 contains a description of the data, and
empirical results are gathered in section 4. In section 5, I discuss possible explanations for my
results, and section 6 concludes.
2 A Tale of Two Papers
Fang and Peress (2009) and Heston and Sinha (2015) both examine the cross-sectional relation
between news coverage and stock returns, but they reach different conclusions regarding the
effect of news coverage. Fang and Peress (2009) use firm-specific news coverage in the New York
Times, USA Today, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post and find that stocks not covered
by the media earn significantly higher future returns than stocks that are heavily covered, even
after accounting for widely accepted risk characteristics.
Each month, they divide the stock sample into no-news, low-news and high-news coverage
groups. The stocks with no newspaper coverage are first identified, and the remaining stocks
are divided into the low- and high-coverage groups using the median number of articles. In
essence, the “high-coverage” group in their setup is an above-median coverage group. Then
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they compute the return in the following month on a zero-investment portfolio that longs the
stocks with no news coverage and shorts the stocks in the “high-coverage” group.
From the time-series of returns obtained from the computation, they find that a portfolio
of stocks with no news coverage outperforms a portfolio of stocks with high news coverage by
almost 3% per year, after adjusting for market, size, value, momentum, and liquidity. They also
find that return difference is particularly strong among small stocks, stocks with low analyst
coverage, stocks primarily owned by individuals, and stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility.
Given these observations, the authors also test two possible explanations for the no-coverage
premium. First, they hypothesize that market frictions are severe enough to prevent arbitrageurs
from exploiting the mispricing. An alternate hypothesis they pose is that stocks with lower in-
vestor recognition need to provide higher returns to their holders as compensation for imperfect
diversification. After testing both hypotheses empirically, they conclude the no-coverage pre-
mium is more relevant to the second hypothesis.
Heston and Sinha (2015) seek to isolate the effect of news tone from the effect of news
coverage, and in doing so they find that firms without news have lower future returns than firms
with news. They use over 900,000 news articles tagged with firm identifiers from Thomson-
Reuters from 2003 to 2010 and estimate a regression of stock returns with lags:
ri,t = αk,t + γk,t · 1Ifnews,t−k + βk,tPositivei,t−k + δk,tNegativei,t−k + i, t (1)
where ri,t is the return on stock i in week t, 1Ifnews,t−k is a dummy variable for firms with news
over the given lag k, and Positivei,t−k and Negativei,t−k are evaluation of sentiment in the
news articles. From this regression, they find a positive coefficient for γk,t, concluding that this
contradicts the well-known adage that “no news is good news.”
Given the two papers that present seemingly contradictory findings, I have identified four
specific aspects of their research designs that may be responsible for the discrepancy:
1. Firm Coverage. Fang and Peress (2009) examine all companies listed on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 500 random companies from the NASDAQ. Heston and Sinha
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(2015), on the other hand, study all firms associated with the data in Thomson Reuters.
2. Timeline. Fang and Peress (2009) examine stock returns from January 1993 to December
2002, whereas Heston and Sinha (2015) study the time period from 2003 to 2010. It is
interesting to note that the two papers do not have any overlapping time periods. Also,
a significant portion of the latter’s time period encompasses the 2008 financial crisis, the
performance during which may potentially drive their findings.
3. News Source. Fang and Peress (2009) use the monthly number of newspaper articles
about a stock obtained from the New York Times, USA Today, Wall Street Journal, and
Washington Post. Heston and Sinha (2015), on the other hand, employ a much broader set
of news provided by Thomson Reuters and aggregate news at a daily and weekly level. The
Thomson Reuters database encompasses a wide range of news items including interviews,
news alerts, and simple snapshots of the market condition.
4. News Filters. Fang and Peress (2009) retain news stories whose relevance score, provided
by LexisNexis, is greater than 90%. Heston and Sinha (2015) retain news stories whose
relevance score, calculated by their algorithm, is above 35%. Furthermore, Heston and
Sinha (2015) exclude news stories linked to more than one article in the sample, whereas
Fang and Peress (2009) do not have any such filters. The low relevance score employed in
Heston and Sinha (2015) is particularly concerning, since this increases the likelihood of
their results being driven by noise than the actual news coverage signal.
From the comparison above, it is very difficult to pinpoint to the element that may be responsible
for the different findings. To verify the existence of a news coverage premium independently, I
use the Ravenpack data and conduct similar analyses. I focus on all stocks in the NYSE from
January 2000 to November 2016 - I cannot go further back than 2000 because the Ravenpack
data starts from January 2000. From the Ravenpack data, I retain news items whose relevance
score, provided by Ravenpack, is greater than 90% and follow the portfolio-based approach
employed by Fang and Peress (2009).
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3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Ravenpack
The provider of news analytics for this study is Ravenpack, which analyzes all articles on the
Dow Jones Newswire and delivers article-level metrics on more than 28,000 publicly traded
companies. It includes a wide variety of news items, including full articles, news flashes, press
releases and tabular materials provided from industry and business publishers, national and
local news, and even blog sites. Ravenpack also provides in-house analytics on each news item,
such as the composite sentiment score (CSS) and the event novelty score (ENS).
One of the metrics computed and provided by Ravenpack is the relevance score, which
indicates the relevance of an article to the company. It takes values ranging from 0 (least
relevant) to 100 (most relevant) – low relevance score implies that the company is mentioned
but playns an unimportant role, whereas high relevance score implies that the company plays
an important role in the main context of the story.
Ravenpack recommends “filtering for relevance greater than or equal to 90 as this helps
reduce noise in the signal.” Beschwitz, Keim and Massa (2013) also verify the appropriateness
of the threshold by examining the response of stock prices to articles with different relevance
scores. Based on their analysis as well as Ravenpack’s recommendation, I only focus on news
articles whose relevance scores are greater than 90.
To get the longest coverage possible, I use the Dow Jones Edition of Ravenpack, which con-
tains articles from Dow Jones Newswires, regional editions of the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s
and MarketWatch. We do not use the full edition, which also contains articles from web pub-
lishers and aggregators as well as press releases and regulatory disclosures, to get the maximum
time period coverage as possible, since the Dow Jones edition is available from 2000 whereas the
full edition starts from 2007.
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3.2 News Coverage
Figure 1 shows the percentage of NYSE stocks that have at least one news item in the Ravenpack
data. From January 2000 to November 2016, on average 65.8% of all common stocks in NYSE
have at least one news article in the given month.
Figure 1: Percentage of NYSE Stocks with News in Each Month
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We also observe that the percentage of stocks with news increases substantially during the
first 6 years of our sample period. One reason for this increase may be the passing of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) which mandated strict reforms to improve financial dis-
closures from corporations and prevent accounting fraud. The more transparent information
environment may have led to a more active coverage of these firms by the media. Another
hypothesis may be related to the widespread use of various electronic media platforms, but I
defer an empirical test of these conjectures for future research.
Fang and Peress (2009) examine the determinants of media coverage and find that firm size
has an overwhelming effect on news coverage. With Ravenpack data, firm size is also significantly
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correlated with the market capitalization of the firm. To illustrate with an example, figure 2
shows the time series of monthly news counts for Pfizer, whose market cap at the end of 2016 was
202.92 billion USD and Trinity Industries, whose market cap at the end of 2016 was 3.97 billion
USD. We also note from the graph that there exist considerable fluctuations in the monthly news
counts for each firm, indicating the potential usefulness of incorporating a time-series signal in
investigating the news coverage premium.2
Figure 2: Monthly News Count for Pfizer and Trinity Industries
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We also examine the pooled distribution of monthly news counts in our sample period,
excluding the stocks without any news coverage. As shown in Figure 3, the distribution of news
items is heavily skewed to the right. This implies that a portfolio constructed from the bottom
decile of monthly news counts would mostly be composed of stocks with only one or two news
items. The distribution of the news counts is also very similar across different years as well.
2Note that the peak in the monthly news count for Pfizer in May 2014 corresponds to the Pfizer’s famous
takeover bid for AstraZeneca that involved the negotiations with the UK government
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Figure 3: Distribution of Monthly News Counts
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3.3 Firm-Level Data
I consider all domestic, primary stocks in the NYSE. Closed-end funds, Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs), trusts, American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and foreign stocks are excluded
from the analysis. Since I require information on the number of shares outstanding, the sample
consists of all companies with coverage on both the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) and COMPUSTAT (Active and Research) files.
Furthermore, I note Fang and Peress’s (2009) concern regarding the bid-ask bounce – the
media effect could be driven by bid-ask bounce, which affects the measurement of small stock
returns. Therefore, I also exclude from my sample stocks with prices below $5.
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4 News Coverage and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
In this section, I focus on the cross-sectional relation between news coverage and stock returns.
I initially focus only on stocks with news coverage and consider the return differential between
stocks with little coverage and stocks with high coverage. Then I repeat the analysis by including
all the stocks and examining the differential between stocks with zero coverage and stocks with
above-median coverage, thereby closely following the methodology in Fang and Peress (2009).
4.1 Low Coverage vs. High Coverage
To examine the effect of news coverage, I form long-short portfolios of stocks sorted by news
coverage. I first exclude the stocks without any news items in a given month in constructing
this strategy. At the beginning of every month from January 2000 to November 2016, I rank
stocks with at least one news item on the basis of the inverse of monthly news counts so that
the top decile contains stocks with the smallest number of news items, and the bottom decile
contains stocks with the largest number of news items. The ranked stocks are then assigned to
one of ten decile portfolios, and all stocks are equally weighted within a given portfolio.
After portfolio formulation, I compute the return in the following month on a zero-investment
portfolio that longs the top decile and shorts the bottom decile. Repeating this computation
every month yields a time series of returns for this portfolio. This time-series is then regressed
on four factor models: the market model, the Fama-French (1993) model, the Carhart (1997)
four-factor model, and a five-factor model that includes the Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity
factor, which allows us to control for stocks’ exposure to the aggregate liquidity risk. If the
return difference between low-coverage and high-coverage is fully explained by known factors,
then the estimated alpha should be significant. Moreover, given that this setup is a natural
extension of the portfolio-based approach employed by Fang and Peress (2009), I expect the
results to be consistent.
Table 1 reports the baseline result in this multivariate setting. The table confirms that there
is a no-news coverage premium even even after controlling for market, size, book-to-market, and
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momentum. The significance goes away when the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor is included
in the regression. The alpha in both the three-factor and the four-factor model is 31 basis points
per month, compared to 51 basis points in the market model. This indicates that about 40%
of the alpha relative to the market model is absorbed by commonly known risk factors such
as value, momentum, and size. These observations are consistent with the regression results in
Fang and Peress (2009).
Table 1: Media-Related Trading Profit: Low Coverage minus High Coverage
Model 1:
Market
Model 2:
Fama-French
Model 3:
Carhart
Model 4:
PS Liquidity
mkt - rf -0.067 -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(-1.86) (-4.73) (-4.34) (-4.27)
smb 0.41∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(9.91) (9.71) (9.51)
hml 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(6.36) (6.26) (6.74)
umd -0.0038 -0.0086
(-0.15) (-0.33)
liq 0.091∗∗
(2.68)
Constant 0.0051∗∗ 0.0031∗ 0.0031∗ 0.0023
(3.15) (2.34) (2.34) (1.71)
Observations 202 202 202 191
R2 0.017 0.372 0.372 0.408
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.363 0.359 0.392
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The loadings on the risk factors provide further insight into the nature of this no-coverage
premium. The positive and significant coefficients on the size factor (SMB), the value factor
(HML) and the liquidity factor (LIQ) indicate that the zero-investment strategy of buying low-
coverage stocks and shorting high-coverage stocks has a positive exposure to small stocks, value
stocks, and liquidity-sensitive stocks. Furthermore, the strategy has a negative exposure to
overall market movements indicated by the negative loading on the market factor. This may
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be due to the fact that short leg of the strategy consists of high-coverage stocks that tend to
co-move more with the market than the low-coverage stocks.
Figure 4 illustrates the growth of $1 on January 2000 invested in each leg of the strategy. We
assume that the return is perfectly scalable, and thus the net asset value (NAV) of the portfolio
in a given month is the previous month’s NAV compounded using the given month’s return.
We see that the long (low-coverage stocks) primarily drives the news coverage effect, and this
asymmetry is also found in the results of Fang and Peress (2009) as well.
Figure 4: Portfolio Growth of Each Leg (common stocks in NYSE)
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4.2 Zero Coverage vs. High Coverage
To further examine the premium associated with zero news coverage, I closely follow the method-
ology of Fang and Peress (2009) by forming long-short portfolios of zero-coverage stocks and
high coverage stocks. Each month, I divide the stocks into no-news, low-news, and high-news
coverage groups. I then compute the return in the following month on a zero-investment portfo-
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lio that longs the stocks with zero news coverage and shorts the stocks with high news coverage.
Repeating this computation every month yields a time series of returns for this portfolio. This
time-series is then regressed on four factor models: the market model, the Fama-French (1993)
model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and a five-factor model that includes the Pastor-
Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor.
Table 2 reports this baseline result in this multivariate setting. Surprisingly, the table shows
that the no-news coverage premium does not exist, whether or not I control for market, size,
book-to-market, momentum, or liquidity. In fact, this strategy produces insignificant returns
and has a negative alpha with respect to the other risk factors.
Table 2: Media-Related Trading Profit: Zero Coverage minus High Coverage
Model 1:
Market
Model 2:
Fama-French
Model 3:
Carhart
Model 4:
PS Liquidity
mkt - rf -0.011 -0.034 -0.035 -0.034
(-0.65) (-1.96) (-1.83) (-1.81)
smb 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(4.95) (4.86) (5.12)
hml 0.053∗ 0.053∗ 0.073∗∗
(2.25) (2.20) (3.03)
umd -0.0018 -0.00095
(-0.12) (-0.07)
liq 0.025
(1.33)
Constant -0.00031 -0.00078 -0.00078 -0.00088
(-0.39) (-1.05) (-1.04) (-1.16)
Observations 202 202 202 191
R2 0.002 0.115 0.115 0.154
Adjusted R2 -0.003 0.102 0.097 0.131
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Despite the disappearance of significant returns, the strategy still loads positively and signifi-
cantly on the size factor (SMB) and somewhat less so for the value factor (HML). The R-squared
values for all models, however, are significantly lower than those in the previous baseline result.
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Perhaps the disappearance of the no-coverage premium is best illustrated in Figure 5 which
graphs the growth of $1 on January 2000 invested in each leg of the strategy. In the period
prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the strategy performs quite well, but during the crisis and
post-crisis, the strategy fails to produce significant returns. On the other hand, I observe that
the low-coverage minus high-coverage strategy, discussed in the previous section, performs very
well post-crisis.
Figure 5: Portfolio Growth of Each Leg (common stocks in NYSE)
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These results, combined with the previous baseline results, seem to indicate that there is
a systematic difference between the group of stocks without any news items in a given month
and the group of stocks that do – sorting stocks based on news coverage for firms with at least
some news seems to deliver handsome returns, whereas including the stocks without any news
coverage deteriorates the performance. We also note that in the most recent several years, the
high-coverage portfolio seems to produce better returns than the no-coverage portfolio, thus
contradicting the findings provided by Fang and Peress (2009).
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5 Discussion
In this section, I discuss potential explanations for the observations from the last section. I also
place my findings in the context of the two aforementioned papers.
5.1 Time-varying premia
The relative performance between each leg of the low-minus-high coverage portfolio shows inter-
esting patterns during and around market crashes. In particular, during the 2008 financial crisis,
the low coverage portfolio significantly underperforms the high coverage portfolio. It could be
that the relative lack of news coverage during market crashes signals negative information about
the firm’s future prospects. This time-varying premium associated with each leg has not been
explored in Fang and Peress (2009), most likely because their time period of analysis, 1993 to
2002, contained little events that could be characterized as a market crash.
But post-crisis, the performance between the two legs reverses: the low coverage portfolio
significantly outperforms the high-coverage portfolio immediately after the “Dotcom Crash”
from early 2000 to late 2002 and the “Housing Bubble and Credit Crisis” from late 2007 to
early 2009. One hypothesis could be that the news-coverage-premium is related to time-varying
exposure to volatility risk and time-varying beta. This hypothesis can be empirically tested
using VIX-imputed variance-swap returns following the methodology in Daniel and Moskowitz
(2015) where the authors try to explain the time-varying momentum premium.
5.2 Availability of News
I also note that my second baseline result of the zero-minus-high coverage portfolio is inconsistent
with the result in Fang and Peress (2009) despite the identical portfolio construction process.
One key difference between my analysis and their time period is that the recent years have
seen an explosive growth in the quantity and scope of news coverage, fueled by the advent of
electronic news platforms and increased accessibility.
Subsequently, it has become much more difficult for firms to receive no news coverage at all,
15
and investors may perceive firms with zero news to be too risky for investment. Perhaps, this
finding is similar to that of the default risk anomaly: stocks with extreme likelihood of default
risk delivers lower future returns, whereas a group of moderately distressed stocks may offer
some risk premium.
5.3 High-quality Firm Disclosures
Another hypothesis is that the introduction of more transparent accounting and firm disclosures
may have reduced the premium associated with news coverage. The early 2000s saw many
occurrences of major corporate and accounting scandals including Enron and WorldCom. The
passing of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to the incidents seem to have enhanced corporate
transparency3 and improved the perceived reliability of their financial statements4.
Given this setup, one may argue that even for firms with zero news coverage, investors can
rely more on firm disclosures to make investment decisions. In other words, the no-coverage
premium could have gone away since even the no-coverage firms have an alternate source of
information channel. If this hypothesis is correct, it can explain the disappearance of the no-
coverage premium as I move from pre-2002 period, analyzed by Fang and Peress (2009) to the
post-2002 period in my results.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I try to reconcile two papers that have reported contradictory findings on the
cross-sectional relation between news coverage and expected stock returns. Especially when the
replication of academic findings is increasingly under scrutiny, this is a highly relevant endeavor.
I first identify potential sources of their discrepancy through a comparative study and also
directly examine the existence of news coverage premium using Ravenpack data.
Consistent with Fang and Peress (2009), I find that stocks with little news coverage earn
higher returns than stocks with high news coverage even after controlling for well-known risk
3See Arping and Sautner (2010)
4See Institute of Internal Auditors (2005)
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factors. But I also document that stocks with zero news coverage do not seem to outperform
stocks with high news coverage, despite following the portfolio construction rules adopted by
Fang and Peress (2009).
These results seem to suggest that the sign and magnitude of the news coverage premium has
changed over time. I pose three hypotheses as explanations but leave their empirical verification
for future research: first, the two market crashes from 2000 to 2016 may have changed the way
investors perceive news; second, the advent of electronic news platforms may have rendered firms
with no news as too risky for investment; and third, the introduction of transparent accounting
and high-quality disclosures may have reduced the premium associated with news coverage.
This paper adds to the existing strand of literature on the relation between media and the
market. While previous literature has focused on newspaper headlines or columns in business
magazines, this is the first paper to examine the news coverage effect using Ravenpack. Because
Ravenpack provides various metrics at the news item level, this study can be extended to examine
the sensitivity of news-coverage premium depending on the time period as well as the novelty,
relevance, and sentiment scores of the news items. This extension is potentially very useful for
practitioners who seek to construct trading strategies based on coverage of stocks in the news.
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